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MUSICAL EXPRESSION AND PERFORMANCE 
by Carl Humphries 
This study examines the philosophical question of how it is possible to appreciate music 
aesthetically as an  expressive art form. First it examines a number of general theories 
that seek to make sense of expressiveness as a characteristic of music that can be 
considered relevant to our aesthetic appreciation of the latter. These include accounts 
that focus on resemblances between music and human behaviour or human feelings, on 
music's powers of emotional arousal, and on various ways in which music may be 
imaginatively construed by listeners. It argues that none of these are entirely 
satisfactory. Then it proposes an alternative account, focusing on what is involved when 
our appreciation of music as an expressive art is informed by our awareness of it as 
something that is expressively interpreted in performance. It is claimed that this offers 
the basis for a better understanding of at least some aspects of expressiveness in music 
and its relevance to aesthetic appreciation. 
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v Introduction 
The subject of this study is the fact that we experience pure music as possessing 
expressive characteristics, and often appreciate it for these. How this could be possible, 
and what it means, are issues that have provoked extensive philosophical discussion. As 
far as is possible within the space permitted here, I will investigate existing attempts to 
shed light on these matters. I will then consider whether a more effective account may 
be given by calling attention to the fact that music is typically (though not always) 
encountered as something performed by human beings, in ways that constitute an 
interpretation of the music as well as a realisation of it. 
Any attempt to evaluate alternative accounts of how we come to experience and 
appreciate music as expressive, or what it means to do so, are complicated by a number 
of considerations. Chief amongst these is the fact that these questions themselves reflect 
a number of distinct issues, and there is no universal agreement about the relative 
importance or priority of these. For example, some prominent theorists (e.g. Levinson 
1982) choose to focus on what is involved in the experience of expressive music, and 
only consider what it means to appreciate it as such in some more strictly defined 
'aesthetic' sense as an afterthought. Others (e.g. Budd 1985a, 1995) take the constraints 
issuing from the latter as basic to any interesting account of expressiveness in music. At 
the same time, many theorists treat the issue of how we actually come to experience 
and/or appreciate music as expressive, and the issue of what it means, in conceptual 
terms, that we do so, as closely intertwined. Some, however, see the second issue as 
essentially reducible to the first (e.g. Meyer 1956), while others insist that it is the 
second of these questions that is the most important and fundamental, so that it should 
be dealt with entirely separately (e.g. Levinson 1996b). Many others appear to occupy a 
middle position, emphasising that it is important to state the conditions 'in virtue of 
which' we hear and/or appreciate music as expressive. The implication here is that any 
satisfactory account should make the role that musical expressiveness plays in our lives 
conceptually intelligible rather than merely psychologically plausible, but in terms that 
should be consistent with, and may usefully be informed by, the latter. 
In some cases differences of approach may also reflect differing views on more 
fundamental issues, rather than differing views on the nature of the central questions 
themselves. Just as there is no clear agreement about exactly how aesthetic qualities in 
art relate to non-aesthetic qualities, there is no clear agreement about how expressive 
1 and experiencable qualities of the artwork itself. 
7 Indeed, such a thought may already be 
implicit in the inseparability requirement mentioned earlier. 
This understanding of the constraints and ideals issuing from the concept of 
aesthetic appreciation can be usefully compared to the list of 'desiderata that an 
acceptable analysis of musical expressiveness must try to meet' proposed by Levinson 
(l996b: 91-2). Levinson holds that such an analysis should (1) be somehow related to or 
analogous with actual cases of human behavioural expression, (2) be related in some 
way to expressiveness in the other arts, (3)  'belong unequivocally to the music itself', 
(4) be immediately experiencable rather than inferred, (5) comprise, amongst others, 
'familiar psychological states of a general sort', (6)  'naturally, if not inevitably' lead to 
a real or imagined experience of feeling/affect, and (7) be something that contributes to 
the aesthetic value of the music. 
(1) is an alternative formulation of the 'ideal of minimal deviation from central 
cases', while (3) corresponds to my 'inseparability requirement'. My 'normative 
constrainability requirement' is a more specific version of (7), designed to reflect a 
Wittgensteinian reading of what it means to value music, emphasising the constitutive 
role of normative agreement about the public grounds for evaluative judgements. This 
leaves (2), (4), (5) and (6) as having no obvious equivalent in my list of constraints. On 
one level (4) seems obviously correct. Yet it is hard to see how one could agree on 
exactly what counts as  'immediately experiencable rather than inferred', given that the 
implied disjunction between these properties is open to question (at least from a 
Wittgensteinian perspective on meaning and expression).
8 My reasons for not building 
the remaining requirements into my initial conception of what an account of musical 
expressiveness should look like are that they do not seem to me clearly entailed by the 
notion of aesthetic appreciation itself. I note that Levinson himself opts for a 
significantly relaxed version of (2) to accommodate his own theory, while (5) seems 
already implicit in (1). On the other hand (6) is formulated in a way that makes it seem 
question-begging for 'dry-eyed' critics - if such persons exist. Anyway, the same point 
7 For a defence of such a minimal constraint, developed with reference to the role of pleasure in aesthetic 
appreciation, see Levinson (l996a: 15). This rules out the Romantic theory of expression, since the causal 
nature of the connections invoked by the theory imply the logical possibility of first individuating the 
psychological causes, and their experiencable effects in the artwork, independently of one another. (The 
concept of a causal relation implies the logical possibility of identifying or individuating cause and effect 
independently of one other.) 
8 Having said this, I follow Levinson in rejecting certain theories because of their failure to meet this 
desideratum. But this is partly because this overlaps with other considerations to do with inclusiveness 
and economy. 
8 can be made by appealing to the ideals of inc1usivity and economy proposed here: an 
account that failed to meet Levinson's desideratum would fail to make sense of large 
areas of the musical experience of many listeners. Hence it would trivialise the concept 
of aesthetic relevance, even if it did not conflict with it. 
9 Chapter One. Resemblance 
The first type of account of what makes music expressive that I propose to examine is 
commonly referred to as either the resemblance theory or cognitivist theory of musical 
expression. I will examine the versions of this theory put forward by its most important 
contemporary advocates, while also considering the principal earlier theories that these 
are responding to. My aim is to establish how far current versions of the resemblance 
theory really furnish the sort of explanation their proponents claim to have achieved. 
The resemblance-based account of music's expressive characteristics can be 
understood as an attempt to avoid the pitfalls of certain earlier theories of expression in 
art and music while at the same time acknowledging certain insights into the specific 
nature of the problem posed by the expressive potential of purely instrumental music. 
On the one hand, it aims to provide an alternative to  17th and 18
th century accounts that 
treat music as exercising a mechanistic power to cause affective responses that then lead 
the listener to perceive the music as expressive. On the other hand, it also rejects both 
the 'Romantic' theory of artistic expression as a form of transmission, according to 
which an artist is driven by his own felt state to produce an artistic creation that causes 
the recipient of the artwork to be infected by similar feelings to those which led to its 
creation (Tolstoy 1895). At the same time, it seeks to distance itself from the 
'formalism' that emerged as the converse of this. The most notable form of the latter 
was Hanslick's insistence that music is incapable of conveying anything like emotions, 
on account of the fact that it fails to furnish states of affairs that could serve as the sorts 
of thing a person could be understood as entertaining those emotions about. Hence any 
expressive qualities music displayed could be nothing more than subjective associations 
projected by listeners (Hanslick 1986). It is significant that the resemblance theorist 
does not seek to dispute the limitations imposed by music's non-referential and non-
representational character in this respect, but seeks instead to establish the possibility of 
music being expressive in spite of them. 
With regard to all of these considerations, the resemblance theorist starts from 
similar premises to those who propose that expressive music should be construed as 
constituting a specific form of symbol, either in the sense of presenting and codifying 
the differentiating characteristics of our experiences of various felt states by standing in 
formal relations of 'isomorphism' to these characteristics (Langer 1951), or in the sense 
of 'exemplifying' some property - some particular type of expressiveness - in virtue of 
10 same 'public criteria of expressiveness' that we must all, standardly, possess, just 
because these are themselves implied by 'public criteria of expression' that must be 
operative wherever human behavioural expression is construed as a publicly constituted 
phenomenon (ibid: 67). This assumes that the sense in which 'public criteria of 
expression' entail matching 'public criteria of expressiveness' is strong enough to carry 
over into contexts where many (and perhaps all) of the background circumstances that 
typically inform our construals of behaviour as constituting a genuine instance of 
expression are inoperative. 
That music is an example of this latter sort of context is surely implicit in its 
being conceived in line with the sorts of consideration that make the Romantic 
transmission theory of expression unacceptable.
6 For Kivy, though, it is evident that this 
entailment is preserved in the case of music, just because we are universally disposed to 
imagine it to be the sort of thing that would be an appropriate locus for encountering 
expression: i.e. as a form of human gesture or utterance. 
The assumption here seems to be that the absence of the background 
circumstances informing our construals of behavioural expression in everyday life does 
not remove the grounds ~or making such construals in connection with whatever it is we 
imagine music to be, but only impacts upon their specificity. That would mean that such 
states as are expressively conveyed in music are limited to just those that can be 
displayed without reference to anything more than the intrinsic qualities of the 
behaviour itself - independently of circumstantial conditions. In short, these felt states 
would have to be consistent with the possibility of being recognised with reference to 
criteria of expression
7 whose public form corresponds to no more than the qualities 
themselves. So they must be recognisable as such independently of whether they are 
also encountered in any wider circumstances consistent with either the idea that they 
correspond to behavioural expressions or not, or with the idea that they are linked to 
human physiognomic or behavioural appearances in some other way. Indeed, such 
recognitions would seem to imply a primitive inclination to take certain forms or shapes 
at face value as genuine expressions without reference to any context at all. However, 
that must surely be considered controversial in the light of Wittgenstein' s suggestion 
that what marks out an expression in the first instance as such is never anything other 
than those facts about it that can be thought of as furnishing a public criterion. In that 
6 See the Introduction to this study for a characterisation of these. 
7 I.e.  'criteria' in the later Wittgenstein' s sense. 
16 respect at least, he may be understood as seeking to approximate to the ideal of minimal 
deviation from central cases. 
Davies' basic strategy, like Kivy's, is to argue that it is a contingent fact about 
us that we are inclined to perceive certain things as possessing expressive characteristics 
even when there is no basis for taking them to be actual expressions. However, his 
account focuses not on the case of inanimate things or non-human creatures (such as 
weeping willows or Saint Bernard dogs), to which one might imaginatively impute 
characteristics associated with specifically human behaviour, but on the expressive 
characteristics that human behaviour itself displays, even when this behaviour is not in 
fact taken to be an actual instance of expression on the part of the person whose 
behaviour it is. Davies calls these 'emotion-characteristics in appearances' (1980: 68; 
1994: 224). It is significant that these not only need not correspond to any occurrence of 
actually felt feelings, but are also 'necessarily publicly displayed and lack emotional 
objects' (1980: 68). They thus correspond to what he calls our 'no-reference-to-feeling' 
use of emotion terms to characterise how people look on particular occasions (or how 
they are disposed to look), where this implies nothing about what they feel (or are 
disposed to feel). At the same time, this use of emotion terms is parasitic upon the use 
of such terms to refer to actually felt emotions, since 'the behaviour which gives one's 
appearance its emotion-characteristic is the same as the behaviour which gives 'natural' 
expression to the corresponding felt-emotion' (ibid: 70). 
For Davies, emotion-characteristics in appearances impose limits on what sort of 
feelings or emotions can be expressed in music, since they can only correspond to those 
feelings whose expressions do not require prior recognition of their emotional object in 
order to be identified as the particular kinds of expression they are. Moreover, not all 
expressive behaviour gives rise to corresponding expressive appearances of this kind, 
and where expressive behaviour is not sufficient to reveal exactly what sort of feeling is 
being expressed without reference to further contextual conditions, the corresponding 
expressive appearances will inherit this ambiguity unless similar contextual conditions 
apply (ibid: 71-2). 
For Davies the perception of such emotion-characteristics in appearances is, 
consequently, a case of aspect-perception - of 'seeing as', understood in a specific way, 
such that for Davies it is to be distinguished not just from ordinary perception (in which, 
for Davies, one's perception is accompanied by a belief that what one perceives is also 
true) but also from forms of imaginative (or make-believe) perception, in which a 
26 most promising point of advantage seems to lie in the thought that his account runs 
parallel to Schopenhauer's conception of music as offering a direct reflection of 'the 
will' and its central realisation (in human life) in emotional experience, in that in so 
doing Budd's own account 'gives a sensible content to the apparently paradoxical 
thought that in the experience of music we perceive directly what ordinarily we can only 
perceive indirectly (as manifested in the appearance of the body), namely the "inner 
life" of emotion' (ibid:  137). 
This would answer a more general line of objection to resemblance theories, 
which emerges in the light of Speck's critique of these, when he states that 
00 .some feelings expressed in music seem to have no counterpart in 
ordinary experience. The feelings expressed in Beethoven's late quartets, 
for instance, often seem unfamiliar, as if the composer were able to 
explore entirely new emotional domains. It seems highly improbable that 
the listener could recognize these feelings from symptomatic 
resemblances. Moreover, many subtle feelings expressible in music do 
not have any overt behavioural expressions at all. We become acquainted 
with these feelings not through their recognition in the behaviour of 
others but by sharing the experiences which evoked them. If music is 
capable of expressing these feelings, then it cannot be by symptomatic 
resemblances. (Speck 1988: 43-4) 
Of course, the resemblance theorist may deny that music is expressive of 
anything other than what can be conveyed through, and is familiar from, overt 
behaviour. However, in doing so he would seem to invite the objection that the 
resemblance theory cannot then, of itself, explain why we should find it preferable to 
contemplate the expressive characteristics of music as they appear in music rather than 
contemplate the same expressive characteristics as they occur in those phenomena 
which the music resembles, and in virtue of which - so it is claimed - we experience the 
music as expressive in the first place.
42 It is perhaps also worth noting that this objection 
is not defused by appealing to the particularity of music's expressive character, as in the 
formulation put forward by Ridley when he characterises sad music as  'expressive of 
42 This is perhaps the most potentially damaging of the objections that Budd raises, and one which has not 
been convincingly addressed, either by advocates of the resemblance theory or those who argue that we 
imagine music to be a form of fictive human behavioural expression. The failure of these theories to 
address this point can then be used as grounds for accepting an  'internalist' account that makes no 
reference to human behaviour at all, e.g. an account based on arousal, or on resemblances to felt states 
themsel ves, or one in which the listener is thought to imagine that the felt states con veyed by the music 
are his own. However, I will argue in due course that this objection can be defused in a way that keeps the 
central reference to expressive behaviour intact. 
54 to show that the inseparability requirement can be met by other means. This is the 
approach taken by Derek Matravers. 
Some aspects of what Madell and Matravers seek to achieve are anticipated in 
an important article by Levinson (1982), dedicated to demonstrating the value of our 
emotional responses to music. Levinson - who nevertheless does not seek to defend any 
form of strong arousalism - argues that higher-order emotions that typically have a 
cognitive aspect and an intentional object can still be differentiated without reference to 
these, in terms of their purely phenomenological and/or sensational character. In this 
sense, unlike Madell, he can be seen as attempting to work within the overall cognitivist 
model of the emotions. At the same time, like Matravers, he attempts to establish that 
these emotional responses are still ineliminably tied to the music even in the absence of 
their typical cognitive aspect. Levinson's arguments on this score are highly perceptive, 
but nevertheless inconclusive - if only because of continuing discussions about the 
exact cognitive character of the emotions (see Goldie, 2000). (Another problem is that 
this approach requires one to give precise first-person characterisations of one's 
introspective experience of undergoing emotions, in a way that divorces these from the 
more public language normally used to characterise such experiences with reference to 
their cognitive aspect, their context, etc. From a Wittgensteinian perspective on 
language, it is not clear how meaningful such characterisations can be.). However, I find 
Levinson's defence of the value of having such responses to music highly perspicuous.
2 
In addition to the general challenge posed by Hanslick's objections towards any 
theory that would treat music's expressive characteristics as relevant to its appreciation, 
to the effect that such characteristics are of their very nature connected with variable 
and wholly subjective aspects of our musical perceptions and responses, the strong 
arousalist also faces a more specific challenge. He must convince us that he is not 
positing an experience of emotional response that we just have alongside our experience 
of the music, but which in fact has no essential connection with the latter. Moreover, he 
must accomplish this in a particularly stringent and direct form, in contrast to the weak 
1 Lack of space prevents me from reviewing this aspect of his account in the detail it deserves. However 
the emphasis of Levinson's position is on the intrinsic value of our responses rather than on their 
relevance (in a strict aesthetic sense) to appreciation of the music itself. Another interesting defence is 
that of Robinson (1994: 20-1), who argues that primitive emotional responses (of the strong arousal kind) 
are necessary to alert the listener to the expressive character of the music, even though the latter character 
is emotionally more complex (in part because it is linked to large-scale aspects of the music's formal 
development). Robinson also seeks to incorporate this into a complex arousalist model of empathetical 
listening (ibid), but does not offer any serious defence of strong arousalism against the objections put 
forward by its critics. 
59 our lives as affectively engaged beings. If Meyer's theory were to be taken as also 
attempting to explain the significance of these sort of expressive characterisations of 
music, it would therefore represent a drastic devIation from central cases. 
This brings home the extent to which Meyer's theory can only properly be 
thought of as shedding light on the most absolutely basic aspects of our affective 
response to music and any perceived expressive characteristics that depend on these. 
Indeed, insofar as Meyer himself hopes to explain more than just these aspects, it is 
partly through an appeal to conventional or personal forms of association with extra-
musical elements - what he calls 'connotations'. These either involve just the sort of 
appeal to wider forms of context-dependency and conventions that resemblance 
theorists and arousal theorists would normally seek to exclude from their account of 
music's expressive characteristics in the interest of economy and inc1usivity, or they 
involve invoking more highly individual and anecdotal aspects of our responses to 
music that are too idiosyncratic to form the basis of value judgements that would be 
consistent with the requirement of normative constrainability. Once these additional 
aspects of his theory are removed, what we are left with is an explanation that only 
permits a thoroughly one-dimensional affective experience of music to be considered 
relevant to our appreciation of it, and this surely falls far short of the ideal of an 
inclusive explanation that would make sense of the full range and intensity of our 
responses to music and of any aspects of our experience of the music that reflect this. 
There is also room for additional doubts about Meyer's own conception of what 
makes this sort of experience of music valuable and interesting for us, where this is 
connected with his appeal to the concept of information. This aspect of his theory has 
been criticised, both as failing to explain why we should value such information, given 
the absence (in the context of purely musical encounters) of any practical use that it 
might otherwise have, and for implying that music is essentially more valuable and 
interesting the more surprising it is - an idea that seems to run counter to the obvious 
fact that the music we value most highly can sometimes be the music we are most 
familiar with (Goldman 1992: 39). 
For a strong arousalist theory like Meyer's to be taken seriously as a candidate 
for explaining anything more than the most basic expressive characteristics associated 
with music's dynamic qualities, we therefore require an understanding of how our 
musically aroused responses could be essentially connected to our experience of the 
62 e.g. shame and embarrassment) (ibid:  134). At the same time, he holds that we do in 
fact respond to music with emotions of this sort. By a process of elimination, he then 
concludes that the patterns of intentional feelings he has described must be invoked as 
essential to any explanation of music's expressive characteristics, since no positive 
alternative exists given what he takes to be the outright failure of both resemblance 
accounts and alternative accounts of strong arousalism based on the standard cognitivist 
theory of emotions. 
I will argue, however, that even if one accepts Madell's account of the nature of 
intentional feelings and their relation to the emotions, he has given us no compelling 
reason to embrace his account of music's capacity to arouse such feelings as being best 
suited to explaining its expressive characteristics and our appreciation of these. 
Madell's rejection of the resemblance theory is principally directed at the 
version developed by Kivy, and has two elements. His more basic claim is that 
...  the claim that the expressiveness of music is in the main a matter of 
resemblance between musical and human expressive gesture cannot be 
sustained. There are, to begin with, far too many examples one could 
mention of pairs of musical 'gestures' that are very similar with respect 
to their 'behavioural' aspect, but which differ very markedly in their 
expressive import. ..  Consideration of 'behavioural' features suggests 
only the broadest of constraints on the expressive character of the 
music ... (Madell 2002:  11) 
From this he moves to his second, more specific objection to the resemblance theory, 
which is that 
.. .in the main the expressive character of music is conveyed not by any 
similarity between musical and human expressive gesture, but primarily 
by the harmonic character of the music, a feature for which there are no 
behavioural analogues. Of course, melody is also an important factor 
which contributes to the expressive character of the music, but it is quite 
wrong to suppose that it does so by describing a contour which 
resembles human expressive gestures. On the contrary, it does so in 
virtue of containing points of tension and relaxation which are harmonic 
in their implications. (Madell ibid:  11) 
Of course, as far as the latter objection is concerned, Kivy accepts that 
expressive characteristics of music that relate to purely harmonic differences (e.g. major 
69 possibility of the same feelings being aroused by factors other than the music about 
which we entertain such beliefs: 
The possibility of such counter-examples stems directly from the arousal 
theory's causal analysis of expression. Because the feeling aroused by 
expressive music is only causally connected to the music and is thus 
independent of it, it follows that the feeling could be aroused by other 
means. (ibid:  169) 
This seems to make Matravers' approach vulnerable to a potentially fatal 
objection lodged at previous versions of the arousal theory that emphasise the non-
intentional or objectless character of musically aroused responses. A typical example of 
the latter would be that of Mew, who claims that music may be significant precisely 
because it represents a counter-example to the idea that emotions can only be 
recognised in ways that involve reference to their intentional objects (Mew 1985: 34), 
and that it can lead us to imagine appropriate objects, some of which are 'permanently 
available for contemplation' anyway (e.g. transience, death) (ibid: 40).15 The standard 
objection is that the same feelings could be induced by a drug, whose effects would, 
absurdly, be in principle just as consistent with this sort of account of why our 
responses should be considered relevant to artistic appreciation. Matravers' strategy, 
however, is to take on board this implication while seeking to show that there are other 
factors central to our musical experience that render it unproblematic: 
The task then is to work within the causal picture: to explain what it is 
about art (and in particular music) that distinguishes its arousing feelings 
from the feelings aroused by taking an appropriate drug. (ibid: 171) 
According to Matravers, there are two essential differences between drug-
induced feelings and non-intentional feelings aroused by music. Firstly, he claims that 
in the musical case, but not the drug-induced one, it is a requirement that the cause (i.e. 
the musical feature in question) be present to consciousness if  it is to be causally 
efficacious. This is because, according to Matravers, such feelings are only aroused in 
the case of music when we attend to it in a sustained and focused way. He holds that 
this must be so because music's capacity to arouse such feelings depends on us 
15  A more detailed and damning critique of Mew's account is given by Ridley (1986) 
76 experiencing its distinctive musical properties, and in particular its dynamic properties, 
and these in turn are constituted out of an experience of its long-term relational 
properties which, he claims, are only evident to the attentive listener (ibid:  178-9) .. 
Moreover, they involve the experience of sounds which, for Matravers, as secondary 
qualities only exist in consciousness, and in his view this is sufficient to defuse Kivy's 
objection against arousalist accounts that posit non-intentional, objectless felt responses 
to music, which is that such feelings necessarily distract from a focused and attentive 
appreciation of the formal qualities of the music itself. According to Matravers, this 
objection loses its sense because both the feelings in question and the formal properties 
of the music only exist for us insofar as they are fully attended to, and do so only in our 
consciousness, so there is nothing to prevent them forming part of a single experience 
(ibid:  172). 
Secondly, he claims that in the case of music we experience the cause (i.e. 
particular musical occurrences) and effect (i.e. our felt responses to these) as unfolding 
concurrently in a far more precise way than would ever be possible in the case of a drug. 
According to Matravers, this is evident from the fact that the cause is one that lends 
itself to phenomenological characterisation in much more complex and precise terms, 
consisting as it does of musical features (and their properties) that are relationally 
defined by their place in unfolding musical structures: 
It is not that one listens to a sound and this simply causes a feeling. The 
connection is far closer than that. At any time during the experience of a 
piece of expressive music, the feeling at that time will be caused by the 
accompanying sound, plus the relations which that sound has to others in 
the piece. The connections are both intricate and intimate, and the 
feelings themselves will reflect this complexity. There is an enormous 
phenomenological difference between the experience of expressive 
music and the experience of having one's mood altered by a drug; a 
difference which is more than sufficient to account for the fact that the 
first causes the belief that the music is expressive and the second does 
not cause the belief that the drug is expressive. (ibid: 180-1) 
This allows Matravers to claim that 'the structure of the music is mirrored in the 
structure of the feelings it arouses' (ibid: 180), and that 'the simultaneous presence in 
consciousness of two things in intimate causal connection ... provides a plausible 
explication for the phenomenological claim that a listener hears the music as expressive' 
(ibid:  182). In this way Matravers claims to have accounted not only for what is 
77 Radford's response is to point out that, as far as his own direct analogy between 
the case of the weather on grey depressing days and the case of music is concerned, 
Kivy has distorted the example, since '[s]uch days seem to work their effect 
immediately, perceptually, not because of the practical consequences they may purport' 
(Radford 1991: 248). In doing so Kivy has also given the false impression of there 
being a disanalogy between the case of weather and that of colour: 
Perhaps gray days would not have their aesthetic emotional effect if they 
were not often cold and damp or did not often herald such consequential 
weather. But perhaps primrose yellow would not look "bright" and 
"cheerful" if sunshine were not bright, primroses were not yellow, and 
we were nocturnal or photophobic creatures. Aesthetic properties as well 
as their effects are often dependent upon, and not so easily separable 
from, the reality underlying them, and what that reality can mean for our 
lives. (Radford ibid: 248) 
Radford (ibid: 248) dismisses Kivy's insistence on the need to appeal to statistical 
evidence as a basis for asserting that certain musical or non-musical phenomena tend to 
cause certain affective responses. He cites the capacity of lively, brightly orchestrated 
dance music to move listeners to the sort of exuberance in which they wish to start 
dancing, as evidence not only of the self-evident character of music's capacity in this 
respect, but also of the fact that this capacity is not confined to a single emotional state 
such as sadness, or to what Kivy would dismiss as arousal effects too 'slight' to be of 
consequence. 
According to Radford, Kivy wrongly assumes that all emotions are rational 
insofar as they involve cognitive attitudes of some kind towards objects, and also 
wrongly ignores moods that may involve no such cognitive attitude at all. This is why 
he is inclined to deny the very occurrence of such felt states as sadness as part of our 
musically aroused responses to sad music (Radford ibid: 249-251). Yet this does not in 
itself constitute a defence of the relevance of such responses to our appreciation of 
music, if this is taken to require some sort of demonstration that in principle such 
responses can be thought of as fulfilling the normative constrainability requirement. He 
has not yet shown that such responses can stand in relations to intrinsic characteristics 
of the music that would be strong enough to serve as a basis for establishing normative 
87 expressive of the very states of mind that, according to Radford, they typically also 
arouse in those who are exposed to them. As Davies points out, 'to deal with this case, 
he [Kivy] must allow that yellow is a cheerful colour while denying that it cheers those 
who live in yellow rooms', and Davies is surely right to agree with Radford in finding 
this implausible (Davies 1994: 302). Nevertheless, Davies is critical of Radford's 
inclination to equate responses to music with irrational moods: 
...  the response to music is not like an objectless mood, for the former 
involves close attention to the music and is a reaction to that close 
attention, whereas the latter is objectless not only in lacking an emotional 
object but also in lacking a specific cause and focus ... If the response to 
music is to be admitted into the "garden" by virtue of its resembling 
some other reactions we accept as ordinary, then the resemblance should 
be closer than that between objectless moods and sad responses to sad 
music. (Davies ibid: 303) 
Davies then puts forward an example of the sort of response which he thinks 
could provide a familiar equivalent for that which we have to music"in virtue of its 
expressive qualities: 
A nearer case to the musical one, a case in which the emotional response 
depends on the expressive character of its cause, is the following. Moods 
seem often to be contagious; we can catch a mood as well as respond to 
one. The company of sad people can be depressing (whether or not their 
sadness is also the emotional object of a response such as sympathy or 
compassion) ... The case described here comes closer to the musical one 
in that it is the situation that affects one's reaction. (Davies ibid: 303) 
However, Davies admits that important disanalogies remain between this 
example and the case of musical responses. On the one hand we do not avoid sad music 
in the way that we may sometimes avoid sad people on account of their making us feel 
sad (through contagion rather than sympathy). On the other hand, whereas it is 
conceivable that even in the case of emotional contagion my mood may be rationally 
informed by a belief that someone somewhere does in fact feel that way, in the musical 
case we do not entertain any such beliefs - assuming that we reject, as Davies does, the 
Romantic transmission theory of expression in art (ibid: 303). 
89 the experience of a sequence of sounds of different pitch heard as displacing one 
another, as they are typically thought to do in the context of melody lines.! For Scruton, 
it is the peculiar nature of this experience of tonal movement, with its undeniable yet 
inexplicable spatial character, that most clearly demonstrates the truth of his central 
claim, which is that our experience of music can only be made sense of by appealing to 
the thought that our perception is informed by an imaginative construal of the music as 
something that it literally cannot be - the sort of construal that is more clearly in 
evidence when we interpret or describe things or experiences in irreducibly 
metaphorical terms: 
Perhaps we should confine ourselves to the study of musical tones; 
whatever auditory space should turn out to be, it is tones that are to be its 
basic occupants. But what now of musical movement? It seems to follow 
that no individual in auditory space can be in two places at different 
times. We have no way to individuate tones except in terms of their 
uninterrupted continuity at a single pitch. Therefore no tone can move 
from one pitch to another, without becoming another tone. Hence no 
individual in auditory space actually moves. We cannot separate the 
individuals from the places they occupy, not even in thought. So there is 
no such thing, materially speaking, as musical movement. 
...  The conclusion we should draw is that, while we hear 
movement in music, this is a fact about our experience, which 
corresponds to no actual movement in the auditory world ... It might be 
tempting then to renounce altogether the idea that there is an auditory 
space ... But if we take that extreme point of view, we end by reducing 
the experience of music to the experience of sound; the distinction 
between a sound and a tone has vanished ... If  we take away the 
metaphors of movement, of space, of chords as objects, of melodies as 
advancing and retreating, as moving up and down - if we take those 
metaphors away, nothing of music remains, but only sound  . 
. . .  It seems then that in our most basic apprehension of music 
there lies a complex system of metaphor, which is the true description of 
no material fact. And the metaphor cannot be eliminated from the 
description of music, because it is integral to the intentional object of 
musical experience. Take this metaphor away, and you cease to describe 
the experience of music. (Scruton ibid: 96-97) 
I The problematic nature of this experience of succession itself, especially as it relates to the experience 
of melodic shape, is not addressed by Scruton, even though it was pointed out and characterised in some 
depth by Husser! (1966) and its implications explored by Zuckerkandl (1956). 
101 ways that would suggest that they express emotional responses to those conditions. This 
is so even if they supervene on qualities of movement and utterance that are dynamic in 
respect of their unfolding in time in just the sort of way that music is.
lO This means that 
Callen has not yet brought us any closer to a justification for responding to music as if it 
were a form of expression. 
Callen then proceeds to invoke the two standard reasons for thinking that it 
could be appropriate for listeners to imaginatively construe music in this way. Firstly, 
the music displays a 'purposive coherence', in respect of its formal and expressive 
qualities (ibid: 385). Secondly, there is 'the recognition that the expressive dynamism of 
a particular movement or work resembles familiar patterns of purposive emotional life 
in the world'. Nevertheless, he admits that 'expressive dynamism and purposive 
coherence cannot be sufficient', as  'almost any series of expressive qualities will 
resemble some pattern of purposive life' (ibid). He insists that there must also be 'a 
concentration and development of particular expressive qualities ... to give the 
appearance of dispositions of mind manifesting themselves in musical events' (ibid: 
386). Unfortunately, he does not explain why the concentrated character of the 
unfolding of music's expressive qualities counts as indicative of 'dispositions of mind 
manifesting themselves in musical events'. If  he takes this concentratedness to be a 
distinguishing mark of human agency, he is surely mistaken. What distinguishes agency 
is not the intensity or concentrated character of the purposefulness evinced by a human 
being's behaviour. It is just the nature of that purposefulness itself, independently of 
how concentrated or dispersed it may seem. 
This point emerges when we consider the differences between human agency 
and those aspects of the behaviour of non-human animals that strike us as  'purposeful' 
or 'purposive'. The purposiveness of animal behaviour is, in almost all instances, fully 
graspable by understanding it as a form of reaction to the immediate environment in 
which the creature finds itself. By contrast that of human action almost invariably 
requires us to look beyond the immediate circumstances in which the behaviour occurs 
to find a context rich enough to fully make sense of it as purposeful. It is in virtue of 
this fact that we are reluctant to characterise anything other than human behaviour as 
evincing what we think of as intentional rational agency (Taylor: 1964). The point is 
lO This parallels one of the reasons for rejecting the Romantic transmission theory of artistic expression: 
artworks generally cannot be perceived by audiences as evolving in response to extra-artistic conditions 
in the kind of systematic ways that would license taking stages in their evolution to be (traces of) 
behavioural expressions of responses to those conditions. 
119 This suggests that it is the additional features of his account, which concern how 
these conventions are thought to function, that will prove crucial to its acceptability. 
Indeed, in this respect, Callen does point to some features that suggest that it is 
appropriate to imaginatively construe our experience of expressive music in this way. In 
seeking to pinpoint conventions that might guide listeners in their identification of 
fictive agents in music, he states that 
[t]he composer and listener share no knowledge of a set of explicit rules 
for unambiguously indicating the presence of unique agents in 
instrumental music. But they do share a knowledge of a musical culture 
that operates with forms, many of which have their roots in forms that 
combine instruments, song, and even dance. Current instrumental forms 
are known to have developed via the practice of substituting an 
instrument for a voice in a vocal work and then via the composition of 
original works in the same forms in which vocal parts are replaced with 
parts written for instruments. These parts are voice-like in that they 
continue to bear the important melodies. Thus, the listener may take an 
instrumental choir to indicate a distinct dramatic agent or group of agents 
as it closely resembles the unitary choral voice of a group of singers 
expressing a single point of view in voice and dramatic action. The brass 
choir may be heard, for example, as one might hear a tenor and baritone 
chorus in an opera in virtue of such qualities as a distinctive bright and 
vigorous tone color, unity of rhythm, melody, dynamics, and harmonic 
coherence that set off the brass from the rest of the ensemble for a time. 
The same family of features appearing later in the work with alteration, 
as say in a change from the minor to the major, can mark changes of 
expression in what are taken to be the same agents. Usually, it is one's 
developing sense of the expressive structure of the work as a whole that 
will help one to decide how best to take a particular musical feature, 
though of course one's grasp of the whole depends upon a reading of 
particulars that is defensible on appeal to a practice which operates 
similarly for a large range of works. 
In short, the listener has a knowledge by which he can defend his 
claim to perceive distinct agents in the music present to him now in 
virtue of a range of properties shared with vocal forms in which dramatic 
conventions operate more straightforwardly. (ibid: 386-7) 
There are two claims here, which are not fully distinguished. The less ambitious 
one is that we hear non-vocal elements in music as substitutes for, or equivalents of, 
vocal ones. 'rVe do this in ways that may reflect an awareness of the historical 
connections linking the musical forms and melodic devices used to the vocal 
equivalents from which they are thought to have been derived. But they may also reflect 
our perception of audible similarities between non-vocal and vocal forms of music 
121 expressive at all (ibid: 54). Ridley is then able to claim that his version of complex 
arousalism avoids the 'heresy of the separable experience'. This is because the 
interdependency or conceptual relation linking the experience of sympathetic response 
to the experience of the music as expressive implies that the former is inseparable from 
the latter:  'the experience of sympathetic response ... is ineliminably an experience of 
the music which occasions it' and so may 'contribute to the value of the music' (ibid). 
Ridley's second strategy attempts to add further weight to his conception of how 
arousalism works in relation to our experience of expressive music, by showing that it 
can resolve an outstanding issue in musical aesthetics. This concerns the need to explain 
how 'pure' music, in which no narrative or dramatic context is represented, can 
nevertheless be experienced as expressively conveying felt states of unusual precision.21 
For Ridley, our sense of the heightened precision of such states comes from the fact that 
our experience of the music as expressive, which necessarily involves and reflects our 
actual sympathetic responses, is therefore already bound up with an experienced state 
that is fully particular. This is the felt state of the listener undergoing these sympathetic 
responses. 
Ridley is, in effect, appealing to the idea that his version of complex arousalism 
resolves a longstanding paradox concerning the expressive particularity or precision of 
music and its expressive generality or vagueness, as further evidence of its overall 
plausibility.22 However, as has already been mentioned, an alternative resolution of this 
paradox is available which avoids the need to resort to arousalism at all (Guczalski 
1999,2005). This fact surely makes his appeal significantly less persuasive. 
What remains is his account of the role played by sympathetic responses in 
experiencing music as expressive in virtue of its resemblances to behaviour. Within this 
lies an implication that in responding sympathetically to music as a condition of hearing 
it as expressive we are already committed to a certain level of imaginative engagement 
with it. This engagement implies that we perceive it in the same empathetical terms as 
we would the behaviour of a human being. Hence it becomes natural to construe the 
expressive evolution of the music over time as conveying psychological changes in the 
21  Ridley invokes as analogous to  'pure' music the example of an actor or mime-artist seen practising 
expressive gestures outside of any particular theatrical context, who we nevertheless respond to 
sympathetically because, like us, he is human. 
22  This paradox has its origins in the writings of Schopenhauer, and figures prominently in Langer's 
approach to the problem of musical expressiveness (as was noted in Chapter One). 
128 related to that is the idea of the music sounding like an expression or 
manifestation of E ... Now, must a passage of music resemble the actual 
limited behavioural repertoire of bodily expressions of E in order to 
sound like - or, more crucially, to be distinctively hearable as - a 
manifestation of E? If it did, that would be an objection to the present 
account, since clearly much expressive music fails to exhibit such 
resemblance to any extent. But there is, it turns out, no logical or 
empirical necessity for that. A passage might cause a listener in a 
nonconceptually mediated way to have certain sub emotional responses 
typical of E, or it might possess features conventionally associated with 
E, or it might resemble natural phenomena that are antecedently 
expressive of E; any or all of these may equally well feed into the overall 
impression that the music is a manifestation or externalization of  E, and 
compensate for the passage's lack of notable resemblance to behavioural 
expressions of E (ibid:  116-7). 
The second objection Levinson seeks to address is closely related to this: 
Some object to the hearability-as-personal-expression account of musical 
expressiveness because they believe it is incapable of handling the 
conventional, or non-resemblance-based, contribution to musical 
expressiveness ... But this worry is without foundation. The hearability-
as-expression account is not committed to isomorphism between musical 
shapes and standard human behavioural expressions being the sole cause 
or ground of a passage's power to induce listeners to hear-as-an-
expression-of - or, for that matter, to its being necessarily the most 
important one. The view is not as such about the mechanisms involved in 
achieved expressiveness but only about what such attributions of 
expressiveness fundamentally mean or amount to (ibid:  117). 
Meanwhile, the third objection that he anticipates comes from a contrasting 
direction, since it claims 
...  that the view cannot deliver the goods precisely because it depends on 
resemblance at all. The idea is that musical progression or sonic 
sequence is simply very unlike human behaviour, whether bodily or 
vocal.  29 My response to this is as follows: first, the charge of unlikeness 
is exaggerated, and overlooks the fact that resemblances are in effect 
created by, or, less flamboyantly, reside in, the dispositions to connect 
things perceptually that natural objects and works of art so readily elicit 
from us; and second, the charge overlooks the way in which gesture in 
line of thought here (Levinson ibid:  111-2). It also reflects his sense of uncertainty about whether hearing 
something as personal expression necessarily involves what he calls a 'pointed' suspension of disbelief or 
not (ibid:  116n). 
29 This objection is raised by Malcolm Budd (Budd 1985a:  132-3). 
l34 A sort of singing, a variably pitched but unmethodical vocalising, may be 
a spontaneous use of what Aristotle called voice, cut free of its 
psychological necessities and no doubt from any special personal or 
social connotations. But that is not quite what we call singing, any more 
than flinging the limbs around is quite what we think of as dancing. It is 
to be distinguished from spontaneous vocalizing in song, which uses the 
tuned singing voice and the determined relationship of one's own 
internalized musical practice, just as people unselfconsciously engaged 
in talk spontaneously shape the vowel stream according to the rules of 
the language they are talking - rules that have become second nature to 
them. (ibid: 204) 
Secondly, he points out that '[e]ven musically formed vocalizing is not quite what we 
mean by singing in a fuller sense' (ibid). This is not merely for the obvious reason that 
song typically involves words, but also because 'the inherently musical structure to 
which voiced sounds themselves are subjected is itself perceived to be language-like. 
Like Aristotle's 'language', it is articulated, using discrete elements, subject to 
conscious composition and manipulation' (ibid).26 This second feature which musical 
singing must possess makes it clear that song also presupposes the 'language'  -derived 
character which Sparshott attributes to music generally: 
[i]n music, analogously ... spontaneous utterance in singing and 
systematic musical composition each has its own priority. Continuous 
vocal modulation without preformation must be in some sense primary, 
because it utters the inherent variability, the continuum on which digital 
systems of modulation are superimposed; but in another sense composed 
music is prior, because it alone manifests the realized form of music as 
an art capable of generating a repertory of determinate objects of 
experience recoverably inscribed. If  such an art did not exist, to call 
unformed vocalization 'music' would be meaningless. (ibid: 205) 
Nevertheless, while Sparshott succeeds here in expressing the different senses in 
which these aspects of music are prior to each other, he has not exactly comprehended 
the significance of this. It is a condition of the possibility of hearing the sounding 
relations that make up music's melodic and harmonic structures that there first be a 
continuous vocal sustaining of the more primitive sort which he has described (or its 
26 Sparshott rightly points out that music's 'language'-like character is separated from real speech by the 
important fact that, unlike the latter, its structural articulations do not reflect the needs of communication 
but engage our interest in themselves (ibid: 204). 
169 resemblances to impassioned utterance at this second level already presuppose a more 
basic first-level characterisation of musical vocalising as something formalised with 
reference to purely musical criteria. In that case such vocalising must surely have been 
stripped of any characteristics that would justify perceiving it as directly connected to 
involuntary forms of impassioned utterance. If that were so, then perceiving such a 
connection at the second level would require one to forget that this first level had 
already brought about a fundamental distancing of expressive musical vocalising from 
its nearest extra-musical equivalent. This would clearly take us no nearer to an 
understanding of the relationship between expressive music and the voice than existing 
theories. Like the latter, we would have to claim that we experience music as expressive 
either because of a partial and essentially contingent resemblance to actual heightened 
vocal expression, or (as in imagination-based theories) because we imagine that what 
we are hearing is not in fact distanced from actual heightened vocal expression in the 
way that it really is. Nevertheless, this objection to an account that links expressive 
music directly to spontaneously impassioned utterance can, I think, be overcome. 
(iii) Expressive Interpretation in Musical Performance 
To see this, we must first remind ourselves that beneath Sparshott's first level of 
modification of 'voice' as a mode of involuntary expressive communication lies another 
distinctive feature of musical vocalising. As has just been argued, this, taken by itself, 
actually corresponds more closely than Sparshott's first or second levels of specifically 
musical vocalising to the intonational character of expressively heightened speech. It is 
a bare intoning that sustains a definite pitch through inflections that form a sequence of 
distinct, pitched tonal events, yet without subsuming these inflections or tonal 
phenomena into a formal musical structure of any sort. 
It might seem unlikely that a comparison between expressive melodic music and 
this kind of intoning could shed significant light on the expressivity of music. This 
activity - even if embedded within more specific forms of music making - only directly 
corresponds to heightened forms of involuntary verbal expression (and thus to  'voice' in 
its original manifestation) at a very primitive level of description of music. That is, it 
only does so at a level that has yet to reflect the specifically musical character which it 
constructed out of the formal system of music itself (i.e. the formal system already in place, 
corresponding to Sparshott's first stage, to which 'voice' is assumed to have already been adapted). 
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